

Dualism

substance dualism vs Cartesian dualism

is mind a "ghost in the machine"? (as sarcastically told by Gilbert Ryle)

personhood: this composite substance, rather than the mind or body alone, with which a person or human being is to be identified.

Minds and brains, apples and oranges

clear and distinct difference between mind and brain, as is between apple and orange.

The particles comprising the cheeseburger have themselves none of the features: no color, odor, taste or texture.

brain is constituted of physical particles just as much as the cheeseburger.

Yet these features do in some sense exist in your mind, in your experiences of the cheeseburger.

sensation of pain, the experience of it, the feel of it - is something only the person knows directly, from the inside.

If you know another person's pain, it is only because you infer, from your own experience.

Possibility of acting and simultaneous bodily procedures.

Physical objects and properties are "public," in the sense that they can, in principle, be directly accessed, via perception, by any observer.

Perception – brain, third person phenomenon or objectivity. introspection – qualia, first person phenomenon or subjectivity.

Meaning is interpretation. meaning is given, not intrinsic. It is epistemologically objective but metaphysically subjective.

physical objects and processes have meaning only when they derive it from minds. This is as true of brain processes as of any other physical process

The Indivisibility argument

A physical object is physically divisible. But a mind is simple, not composed of parts and thus not divisible into further, smaller units.

Cartesian explanation of various aspects of the mind: reason, sensation, emotion

mind is, unlike the body, immortal.

Descartes's conviction that the mind is a simple substance stems from the cogito argument.

Criticism: "multiple personality disorder" (MPD)

Counter criticism: The reality is that it simply isn't clear that MPD cases really are, in the first place, cases of multiple minds existing in one body.

The "indivisibility" argument remains controversial, but since the evidence of the mind's divisibility is inconclusive, it seems the argument hasn't decisively been refuted.

The conceivability argument

"conceivability argument" is the paradigmatic argument for dualism.

different kinds of possibility and impossibility: Physical vs metaphysical impossibility. A world where squares are circular and $2 + 2 = 5$ cannot be coherently described; the very attempt to describe it involves a **contradiction**.

So, there can be no such world. We might sum this up by saying that metaphysically impossible worlds, like a world with circular squares, are strictly inconceivable—we cannot even imagine the existence of such a world, for the attempt to do so involves a contradiction. By the same token, though, the fact that we can conceive of worlds where a two-minute mile is possible is reason to believe such worlds are not metaphysically impossible.

This suggests the following principle: for any A and any B, if A = B, if it is metaphysically possible to have A without B, then A and B can't really be identical after all.

Descartes argued it was still at least possible that his body, including his brain, did not exist, because those things might just be **part of a hallucination** or is put into his mind by an **evil spirit**.

it is entirely conceivable that one could exist as a disembodied mind with a body-imagination of simulation.

So, it is conceivable and therefore at least metaphysically possible for the mind to exist apart from the brain. Therefore, the mind is not identical to the brain.

Saul Kripke's "**rigid designators**": A rigid designator is an expression that denotes the same thing in every possible world. Examples: water and H₂O and Neil Armstrong and first moon walker.

it is **only identity statements involving rigid designators** which, if they are true at all, cannot possibly be false and there are no genuine counter examples to the principle that conceivability implies metaphysical possibility.

The Interaction problem

the gist of the conceivability argument: mind cannot literally see or in general perceive the world of physical objects unless it is joined to a body; cut off from a body, it becomes, as it were, trapped within itself.

But that just means the mind needs the body in order to do anything other than merely hallucinate; it doesn't mean it is identical to the body or any part of it.

how can the mind and brain possibly interact? Of course, it seems obvious that they do; the problem is that dualism appears to have no way of explaining how this is possible.

occasionalism holds that God serves as the link between mind and brain,

Mind and body are like two clocks operating entirely independently but keeping up with each other so perfectly that it seems that there is interaction between them. There is a "**pre-established harmony**" between them - pre-established by God, who is responsible for having wound up the clock of mind and body in the first place.

Criticism of God hypothesis: it is always preferable, if possible, to avoid having to defend one controversial position by appealing to another which is at least as controversial.

epiphenomenalism holds that events in the brain and body produce events in the mind, but that those mental events in turn have no causal influence on what happens in the brain and body. They are mere "epiphenomena,"

what causes the actions are just further, purely material, unconscious brain Processes.

Criticism of interactionism: causal interaction between Cartesian material and immaterial substances seems to violate the laws of physics.

Scientific materialism: Most contemporary philosophers have accordingly sought to develop a materialist conception of the mind in which it is just another part of the physical world.